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SEE NO EVIL: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND
THE PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS OF OFFERING




Jailhouse informants and dishonest experts have long been identified as
significant causes of wrongful convictions.1 While DNA tests can negate
the accusatory testimony of these witnesses, many cases do not have
biological evidence to test-either because the evidence is lost or destroyed,
or, more likely, because the type of crime cannot be solved by DNA testing.
When DNA evidence is unavailable, defendants convicted based on the
testimony of jailhouse informants or dishonest experts often seek reversal
for due process violations. In these due process claims, defendants
generally allege that the prosecutors knowingly introduced false or
perjurious testimony, 2 did not correct the testimony when its falsity was
discovered, 3 or failed to disclose exculpatory BradjA material that would
have contradicted the mendacious witness. 5 The testimony of jailhouse
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, and Co-chair American Bar Association
(ABA) Criminal Justice Section's Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of
the Criminal Process. This essay was supported by a summer writing grant from
Southwestern Law School.
1. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer et al., Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong and How
to Make It Right 361 (2001) (noting that, out of the first 74 DNA exonerations, 19% of the
convictions involved "informants/snitches" and 34% involved defective or fraudulent
science); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 543-44 (2004) (noting that, out of 340 exonerations, 24
included allegations of perjury by forensic scientists testifying for the government, and at
least 97 cases involved perjury by a "jailhouse snitch" or another witness who stood to gain
from the false testimony). See generally Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. on Wrongful
Convictions, The Snitch System: How Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl and Other
Innocent Americans to Death Row (2004) [hereinafter Northwestern], available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/documents/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
3. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959).
4. Brady v. Maryland holds "that the suppression of evidence by the prosecution
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution." 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 703 (2004) (holding that Brady requires
prosecutors to disclose a witness's status as a paid informant); Giglio v. United States, 405
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informants and dishonest experts also may violate a myriad of other
constitutional, procedural, and evidentiary laws.6 Little attention has been
directed toward the ethical implications for prosecutors who solicit and
present the dubious testimony of experts or informants in court. Even
assuming full compliance with Brady and the absence of any prosecutorial
request for false testimony, the government's reliance on these witnesses is
cause for concern. Are such prosecutors willfully blind to the likelihood of
perjury, or are they simply taking their witnesses as they find them to
advance the cause of justice in a criminal justice system where investigative
resources are stretched thin over an ever-increasing caseload? While some
claim that the introduction of such testimony is inherently intertwined with
disclosure issues, I believe that assessing the two issues separately is better
suited to formulate solutions that encourage ethical prosecution.
In an era defined by the reversal of more than 200 wrongful convictions
through DNA testing, there is no shortage of articles addressing the false
testimony of cooperating witnesses, derogatorily called "snitches" even by
many who use them. This essay refers to them as jailhouse informants,
since the issue here is not the morality of informing, but whether their
testimony is untruthful, and whether the falsity is or should be obvious to
prosecutors. The commentators and other groups analyzing this problem
suggest a variety of procedural remedies, 7 such as reliability hearings,
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding that Brady requires prosecutors to disclose any evidence
related to a witness's credibility).
6. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 (reliability and expert qualifications); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (prohibiting unreliable expert testimony);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274
(1980) (holding that a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs if an undercover agent
coaxes information out of a prisoner); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07
(1964) (discussing dimensions of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel concerning law
enforcement use of jailhouse informants); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) (prohibiting scientific evidence that is not generally accepted). Other cases
involve jurisdictional requirements concerning corroboration, and cautionary instructions
among other restrictions. For example, California Penal Code sections 1127 and 4001.1
(West 2007) respectively require the contemporaneous filing of a written statement with the
court that describes all consideration promised to or received by the in-custody informant
and restricts monetary payments to $50.
7. See, e.g., Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty, Report of
the ABA Criminal Justice Section's Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of
the Criminal Process 63-78 (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter ABA
Report]; Aaron M. Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent
Unjust Convictions, 23 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 151 (2004); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The
Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 645 (2004); Barry Scheck,
Closing Remarks, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 899 (2002); Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New
Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 81 (1994); Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their
Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 257 (2005); see
also Cal. Comm'n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Report and Recommendations Regarding
Informant Testimony 4-6 (2007) [hereinafter CCFAJ Report], available at
http://www.ccfaj .org/documents/reports/jailhouse/official/Official%20Report.pdf; Ontario
Ministry of the Att'y Gen., Comm'n on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin,
Recommendations 36-39 (1998) [hereinafter Morin Recommendations], available at
[Vol. 761414
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cautionary instructions, corroboration requirements, and full disclosure of
any consideration offered to or reasonably expected by the witness. A few
articles concentrate solely on jailhouse informants, 8 but most focus
primarily on accomplices and confidential informants who act as soldiers
on the front line of the war on drugs. Even the little empirical data that
exists about cooperation has been directed at accomplices, rather than
jailhouse or other informants. 9
Arguably, prosecutors should also be aware that the testimony of
questionable experts carries a high probability of falsity. While it may be
difficult to separate incompetent experts from dishonest experts, my
definition includes (1) expert shopping by prosecutors who cast a wide net
before finding an expert who agrees with their desired conclusion, (2)
experts who describe the results of problematic techniques using statistical
comparison that have no basis in fact,' 0 (3) experts who see something that
none of his or her colleagues can find or duplicate, and (4) experts who
simply lie, whether about their qualifications or their findings. Countless
articles condemn the admission of junk science and lying experts in
criminal cases,'' particularly concerning microscopic hair analysis, bite
marks, boot marks, and handwriting, as well as syndrome evidence and
http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin-recom.pdf;
Manitoba Justice, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: Jailhouse Informants, Their
Unreliability and the Importance of Complete Crown Disclosure Pertaining to Them (2001)
[hereinafter Sophonow Inquiry],
http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/jailhouse/recommend.html.
8. See, e.g., Valerie Alter, Jailhouse Informants: A Lesson in E-snitching, 10 J. Tech.
L. & Pol'y 223 (2005); George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of
Snitches and Experts, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants,
Crim. Just., Spring 2003, at 20.
9. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917, 937 n.89 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 17, 32 (2003) [hereinafter Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence]
(discussing fabricated statistics concerning a hair analysis and concluding that the results
were so far-fetched that they suggest the prosecution made a conscious effort to obtain a
conviction based on manufactured testimony with the expert's assistance).
11. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert:
Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867 (2005); Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the
Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 381
(2004); Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the
Prosecution: What's Wrong with Daubert and How to Make It Right, 2007 Utah L. Rev.
131; David L. Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of
Ignorance of Science Is an Excuse, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 87 (2001); Paul Giannelli, The Abuse of
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va.
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 439 (1997) [hereinafter Giannelli, Abuse of Scientific Evidence]; Myrna S.
Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions and Rationality, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1315; D. Michael Risinger, Navigating
Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L.
Rev. 99 (2000); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and
Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 1023, 1036-50; Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56
Emory L.J. 275 (2006); Paul Giannelli, Bite Mark Evidence, Crim. Just.. Spring 2007, at 10,
42; Paul C. Giannelli, Fabricated Reports, Crim. Just., Winter 2002, at 49.
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predictions of future dangerousness. Yet very few of these are written from
an ethical rather than evidentiary perspective, 12 and most of the proposed
remedies are aimed at the judicial process, not at prosecutors. Calls for lab
accreditation, certification of experts, and expanded disclosure requirements
for expert data, if successful, will clearly decrease the ability of dishonest
experts to escape notice. However, this essay encourages self-regulation by
prosecutors, since they can act as the initial gatekeepers who prevent the
introduction of testimony based on bogus science, deceitful experts, and
lying jailhouse informants that might otherwise be admitted by the courts.
Thus, I explore a much narrower issue than is presented by most of the
jailhouse informant and expert literature: Are prosecutors at fault for
reaching out to witnesses whose testimony sounds too good to be true when
it fills in the gaps that otherwise would likely derail the prosecution's case?
This essay addresses the following questions: Does such conduct clearly
violate prosecutorial ethical obligations when all impeachable material
possessed by the government is disclosed? Is an ethical violation sufficient
to obtain a reversal of the defendant's conviction by a jury that chooses to
believe the testimony of these impeachable witnesses? 13 Assuming that
answer is no, is it beneficial to clearly label the presentation of such
testimony as ethically problematic and to propose clarifying ethical rules to
specifically address such conduct?
I conclude that significant institutional goals warrant such clarification,
regardless of the reach of the current ethical rules,' 4 or the defendant's
inability to obtain a reversal when the introduction of this type of evidence
does not violate constitutional or statutory law. My objective is not to bash
prosecutors for resorting to jailhouse informants or questionable experts.
There may be instances where, even under stringent prosecutorial review,
such witnesses appear to be truthful, 15 justifying prosecutors to introduce
12. See Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations ofAttorneys, 49
Clev. St. L. Rev. 421, 436 (2001). See generally Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence,
supra note 10; Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions, " Science, and the Ministers of
Justice, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
13. Cf Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). The court
affirmed the defendant's conviction and rejected a habeas claim of ineffective assistance by
defense counsel who had challenged the testimony of jailhouse informants in closing
argument by reviewing in detail how the informants "could have concocted information
about the crime." Id. Defense counsel also pointed out that one informant had said .'I'm
going to use this to get out of my case,' which is precisely what jailhouse informants bent on
securing their own freedom at any price frequently do." Id. The case did not address any
ethical questions. Id.
14. Although the ethics of experts is beyond the scope of this essay, it is a related topic
that has received little discussion in the legal literature. See generally Michael J. Saks, Ethics
in Forensic Science: Professional Standards for the Practice of Criminalistics, 43
Jurimetrics J. 359 (2003) (book review); J. Vincent Aprile II, Know the Ethics of the Expert
Witness, Whether Friend or Foe, Crim. Just., Summer 2006, at 45.
15. See, e.g., Fredric N. Tulsky, Tighter Safeguards Urged When Using Jail Informants,
San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 21, 2006, at Al (citing a prosecutor who noted rare cases in
which an informant pointed officials to the body of a murder victim or to the weapon used in
a crime); see also Morin Recommendations, supra note 7; Sophonow Inquiry, supra note 7
[Vol. 761416
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the testimony pursuant to their role as advocates. 16 This is particularly true,
given that the evidence will still be subject to defense challenges, as well as
to judicial and jury review. Rather, I hope this essay encourages
prosecutors to seriously consider their ethical obligations to innocent
defendants 17  by creating standards and policies to self-regulate
prosecutorial reliance on such witnesses so that their appearance at trial is
the exception, rather than the norm. 18 As commentators have recognized,
hortatory rules are not a perfect solution, but promote education, self-
reflection, and transparency in the decision-making process. 19 In fact, some
believe that internal regulations are "'absolutely critical"' to setting and
maintaining the appropriate ethical tone for prosecutors. 20
Beyond strengthening rules and standards, I also suggest that prosecutors
create their own self-regulatory commission to review cases of individuals
who were wrongfully convicted of crimes and later exonerated by the
judicial system. Such retrospectives would both reinforce the ethical
obligation of prosecutors as ministers of justice and provide a friendly
forum to address the underlying causes of erroneous convictions.
Hopefully, these reviews would lessen the knee-jerk hostility that many
prosecutors hold toward innocence commissions, because they fear "witch
(severely restricting but not instituting outright bans against the use ofjailhouse informants).
Similarly, expert shopping may be appropriate when the expertise is so specialized that the
contrary opinion of a less qualified expert consulted earlier should not disallow the
testimony, assuming the previous negative opinion is disclosed to the defense.
16. See Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function
Standard 3-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that the prosecutor is "an advocate"). Ethical
questions implicated by the general introduction of evidence in an adversarial trial are also
not considered in this essay. See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern
Adversary Trial, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (2006).
17. See Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function
Standard 3-1.2 cmt. ("[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the
innocent as well as to convict the guilty.").
18. 1 recognize that self-regulation sometimes connotes that specific ethical rules are not
adopted. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors'
Ethics, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 381, 469-73 (2002). However, given the infrequent resort to
disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors, I view the adoption of specific ethical precepts,
whether in the ABA Model Rules or the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, or by the
National District Attorneys Association Standards, as a means to self regulate and educate
prosecutors.
19. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 964 (1996)
(self-reflection); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 399,
421-25 (transparency through adoption of policy manuals); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and
Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1513
(2000) (education); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223,
231-37 (1993) (explaining the parameters of the system and promoting introspection).
20. Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical Rules
Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23 Cardozo L.
Rev. 875, 889 (2002) (quoting Panel Discussion, The Regulation and Ethical
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 737, 744 (1999)).
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hunts" directed to unmask evidence of their wrongdoing. In contrast, the
actual purpose of such reviews is to assess the reasons behind the justice
system's failure and the lessons we can learn from these tragedies,
regardless of whether their cause was purposeful wrongdoing or a
combination of unintentional mistakes. Prosecutors, as well as the defense
bar, recognize that, whenever an innocent person is convicted, the true
assailant remains at large and continues to threaten public safety. Thus,
adopting policies and practices best suited to ensure the conviction of the
guilty and the acquittal of the innocent is a goal that unites the entire
criminal justice community.
While my exceedingly short stint as a special assistant U.S. attorney in
Washington, D.C., in 1972 to 1973, as part of an E. Barrett Prettyman
Fellowship at Georgetown Law Center, does not qualify me as a true former
prosecutor, it left me with a profound respect for that office, as well as for
the power and responsibilities of ethical prosecutors. My many encounters
with state and federal prosecutors during the last twenty years within the
American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Section, in the section's
council, as chair of the section, and more recently as co-chair of its Ad Hoc
Innocence Committee, have reaffirmed my belief that good prosecutors take
their ethical responsibilities seriously. However, some prosecutors
undeniably care little about ethics and may easily evade or misconstrue
their obligations. As constitutional or evidentiary principles cannot
magically solve the issues presented here, the prophylactic effect of ethical
rules appears to offer the best solution for keeping jailhouse informants and
dishonest experts from polluting the search for truth at trial. Moreover, the
current push toward corroboration requirements for jailhouse informants
and more stringent regulation of forensic science by accreditation,
certification, and pretrial disclosure requirements 21 will complement the
imposition of heightened ethical obligations.
I. JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS AND DISHONEST EXPERTS:
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Significant ethical and legal implications arise for prosecutors when the
government offers leniency to individuals who take part, or claim to take
part, in crimes. An offer of leniency "gives the witness a powerful
incentive to fabricate his testimony in order to curry favor with the
government, '22 and also to find "a fast and easy way out of trouble with the
law." 23 Judge Stephen S. Trott, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
21. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 7 (citing recommendations); CCFAJ Report,
supra note 7.
22. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice," 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 635, 655
(2006); see Kim Wherry Toryanski, No Ordinary Party: Prosecutorial Ethics and Errors in
Death Penalty Cases, Fed. Law, Jan. 2007, at 45.
23. Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001).
1418 [Vol. 76
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the Ninth Circuit and a longtime critic of the unregulated use of cooperating
witnesses, 24 has cautioned,
[B]ecause of the perverse and mercurial nature of the devils with whom
the criminal justice system has chosen to deal, each contract for testimony
is fraught with the real peril that the proffered testimony will not be
truthful, but simply factually contrived to "get" a target of sufficient
interest to induce concessions from the government. Defendants or
suspects with nothing to sell sometimes embark on a methodical journey
to manufacture evidence and to create something of value, setting up and
betraying friends, relatives, and cellmates alike. Frequently, and because
they are aware of the low value of their credibility, criminals will even go
so far as to create corroboration for their lies by recruiting others into the
plot.2 5
My present essay is limited to the most problematic of the cooperating
witnesses: jailhouse informants. As jailhouse informants pose the clearest
threat to the integrity of the criminal justice system, an appeal to
prosecutorial ethics to limit the most flagrant examples of their misuse
should garner the broadest possible support. As Judge Trott has warned,
"The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims
another prisoner has confessed to him."'26  A Canadian commission
investigating the causes of a wrongful conviction flatly stated that
"[j]ailhouse informants comprise the most deceitful and deceptive group of
witnesses known to frequent the courts.... They are smooth and
convincing liars." 27 Jailhouse informants claim no insider knowledge of the
crime; rather, their ticket to freedom or other rewards is based entirely on
the alleged confessions made to them by defendants, which in an
information-friendly world may be spun from whole cloth.
Nearly twenty years ago, Leslie Vernon White, who admitted to
committing multiple acts of perjury as a jailhouse informant, joked that the
"snitch" system had spawned such slogans as "Don't go to the pen, send a
friend" and "If you can't do the time, just drop a dime," demonstrating to a
shocked nation watching 60 Minutes exactly how easy it is to create a false
confession without ever having spoken to the defendant.2 8  In many
jurisdictions, little has changed and access to the Internet, media, and cell
phones by inmates and/or their friends has increased their ability to obtain
what sounds like insider knowledge. The incentives for jailhouse
informants to lie are so great, and the consequences so minimal, that
prosecutorial reliance on this category of cooperating witnesses is always
ethically challenging. The truthfulness of jailhouse informants is
permanently suspect, unless the conversation with the defendant is
24. See generally Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals
as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381 (1996).
25. Bowie, 243 F.3d at 1124.
26. Trott, supra note 24, at 1394.
27. Sophonow Inquiry, supra note 7.
28. See Northwestern, supra note 1, at 2.
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recorded, and the confession is actually captured on the tape. 29 Jailhouse
informants are willing to ply their trade not only when requested by jailers,
police, or the prosecution, but also as entrepreneurs, claiming confessions
were made to them by cellmates, seatmates on the bus to court, or simply
by high-profile defendants who passed their way in the yard or cafeteria. In
some jurisdictions the focus of jailhouse informants' testimony has shifted
in capital cases from the guilt phase to the penalty phase in order to prove
special circumstances or provide evidence of aggravating factors. 30
Similarly, when prosecutors go "expert shopping" (casting a wide net
before finding an expert to agree with their desired conclusion) and find an
expert whose conclusion cannot be duplicated, they arguably are on notice
that the expert's testimony is potentially false. In addition, prosecutors
should be on the lookout for inaccurate or misleading testimony when
offering an expert who presents statistics without scientific basis or relies
on questionably reliable techniques, such as hair or bite mark analysis. This
is true even if the testimony otherwise goes unchallenged by the defense, or
the judge finds the issue is one of credibility, rather than admissibility.
Such experts are often called "prosecution friendly," a term that captures
their bias, which in turn may color their evaluation of the evidence. 31 Some
might argue that this term sweeps legitimate forensic experts into the mix,
when the evidence realistically favors the prosecution and the expert's
testimonial style persuasively reinforces the findings. But something more
than persuasive pro-prosecution testimony is at play with dishonest experts.
For example, Fred Zain, the director of serology in West Virginia, whose
forensic misdeeds spurred a lengthy investigation and report to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 32 as well as ultimately unsuccessful
prosecutions for perjury, was referred to by colleagues as "'pro
prosecution.' 33 After Zain left to work in Texas, prosecutors asked him to
review his previous results when they could not be duplicated. Again his
29. Cf Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois: The
Inside Informant, Chi. Trib., Nov. 16, 1999, at I (noting that a jailhouse informant taped
defendant for six hours with a recorder supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and,
in spite of the absence of an alleged confession from the recordings due to claimed
malfunctions, the prosecution offered the testimony on the theory that the informant knew
private details of the crime, although a different prosecutor called the jailhouse informant a
pathological liar).
30. See CCFAJ Report, supra note 7, at 1-2 (noting that State Public Defender Michael
Hersek reported that 17 of the 117 death penalty appeals then pending in his office featured
testimony by in-custody informants, rarely concerning evidence in the guilt phase of the
trial, but crucial to special circumstances); see also Ted Rohrlich & Steve Berry, Judge
Deals Blow to Use of Jailhouse Informants, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1999, at B1 (reporting that a
death penalty sentence was overturned where a jailhouse informant with a "proclivity to lie"
provided the only evidence of the identity of the shooter but that other evidence was
sufficient to establish defendant's guilt).
31. See Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 10, at 31. See generally D.
Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
32. See In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993).
33. Id. at 503.
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results favored the prosecution. 34 Moreover, in spite of concerns about his
work, Zain was asked to perform new tests after he left because "several
prosecutors expressed dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving
from serology and specifically requested that the evidence be analyzed by
Zain." 35 In essence, unless prosecutors had reason to believe that everyone
else in serology was incompetent, only willful blindness kept them from
knowing that Zain's testimony was false.
Similarly, Joyce Gilchrist, an African-American forensic chemist, known
as "Black Magic" for her ability to sway juries with evidence only she
could see,36 was later investigated when many of her incorrect hair analyses
were disclosed by DNA exonerations. In a reversal of one of her more
egregious cases, the court found that she knew her testimony was false and
misleading because it was contradicted by evidence that was withheld from
the defense. 37 Years earlier, she had been criticized within the forensic
community for her "missionary zeal" that put "blinders on her professional
conscience. '38 On 60 Minutes, another crime lab examiner noted, "You
have to look at the prosecutor's office. They must have understood what
was going on with all those flags being waved."'39
Unprofessionally zealous prosecution experts are not simply denizens of
crime labs. Dr. James Grigson, referred to more dramatically as Doctor
Death,40 was a favorite with prosecutors who wanted to demonstrate the
future dangerousness of defendants in capital cases. Without a doubt,
Grigson's willingness to classify every defendant that he examined as
dangerous accounts for his testimony in one murder case where he was
certain the defendant, Randall Adams, would kill again. 41 In fact, the
prosecution's key witness in that case, Davis Harris, was later revealed as
the murderer, and it was Harris who killed again before Adams was
eventually freed. 42 Similarly, the special prosecutor who convicted a Texas
pathologist accused of fabricating autopsy results claimed, "If the
prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then
that was what [he] reported. '43
34. Id. at 512.
35. Id. at 512-13 n.16.
36. Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 209, 236 (2006).
37. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001).
38. James E. Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. Forensic Sci. Soc'y
111, 132-33 (1991).
39. See Paul C. Giannelli, Alchemy, Magic, and Forensic Science, Crim. Just., Fall 2006,
at 50, 52.
40. See Eric F. Citron, Note, Sudden Death: The Legislative History of Future
Dangerousness and the Texas Death Penalty, 25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 143, 159 (2006).
41. See Richard H. Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 Ky. L.J. 919, 979
(1999).
42. See id.
43. Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist's Plea Adds to Turmoil: Discovery of Possibly
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24, 24.
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Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,44 one of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court
decisions concerning the nature of prosecutorial immunity, analyzed the
following statement of facts:
After three separate studies by experts from the Du Page County Crime
Lab, the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, and the Kansas Bureau
of Identification, all of whom were unable to make a reliable connection
between the print and a pair of boots that petitioner had voluntarily
supplied, respondents obtained a "positive identification" from one Louise
Robbins, an anthropologist in North Carolina who was allegedly well
known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony. 45
The jury deadlocked and Buckley was never retried, although the defendant
languished in prison for two more years, while someone else confessed to
the crime. 46 Charges were only dismissed after the death of Robbins, 47
whose $10,000 fee clearly reflected her contribution to the prosecution's
case. 48  Unfortunately, other examples of fake expertise abound. 49  A
forensic dentist earned a fee of $50,000, ten times more than the average fee
at the time, for testifying that a jagged bite mark came from the defendant,
in contradiction to the testimony of nine other forensic dentists. The
resulting conviction was ultimately overturned by DNA testing.50
II. PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS
CONCERNING JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS AND EXPERTS
While it is easy to favor abstract principles of justice when writing in an
academic setting, it would be facile not to recognize that these ethical
problems arise in a real-world context that has changed dramatically in the
recent past. The minimal amendments to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 2002 that affected prosecutors 5 1 provided little
concrete guidance as to how to exercise prosecutorial discretion in a
twenty-first-century world. Today's center stage is occupied by the war on
drugs, an ever-expanding technological revolution, an ever-growing prison
44. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
45. Id. at 262.
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id.
48. See Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty: An Illinois Murder Case Becomes a Test of
Conscience Inside the System, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1992, (Magazine), at 18.
49. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736, 748 (Miss. 1999) (McCrae, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the majority's approval of bite mark evidence and stating that "[t]his is not the first
time that Dr. West has been able to boldly go where no expert has gone before"). See
generally Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 10 (identifying examples of
dishonest experts); Giannelli, Abuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 11 (same); Richard H.
Underwood, Evaluating Scientific and Forensic Evidence, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 149
(2000) (same).
50. See Robert Nelson, About Face, Ray Krone's Got It All. A New Look. Money.
Problem Is, He Can't Seem to Forgive Those Who Screwed Up and Put Him on Arizona's
Death Row, Phoenix New Times, Apr. 21, 2005, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2005-
04-21/news/about-face/print.
51. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 19, at 417-20.
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population, and the advent of terrorism. Just as the television show 24
stirred debates about whether its depictions would affect how a new
generation of soldiers views the role of torture to obtain information, 5 2 one
can hardly turn on the television without seeing the role of a district
attorney glorified as that of simply putting the bad guys away in an hour,
regardless of the tricks employed. This Machiavellian view that the ends
justify the means in criminal justice has been ingrained for so long that an
entire generation has grown up assuming this is the appropriate way for
prosecutors to behave, regardless of whether it is "an idea that is plainly
incompatible with our constitutional concept of ordered liberty."53
The public pressure on prosecutors has grown significantly in a world
where news is 24/7, blogs are omnipresent, and commentators abound.
Victims' rights have become an anthem, and while previous disregard of
them called for some rebalancing, the result has been a wholesale
denigration of the rights of criminal defendants. 54 Legislators fear being
considered soft on crime, and punitive sentencing schemes make even
innocent defendants blanch, particularly when they have a prior criminal
history that will greatly increase their sentences if they gamble on a trial. 5 5
In addition, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the "CSI effect"56
reinforces the public's belief that forensic scientists have all of the answers
that will lead unerringly to the bad guy, though this ironically may backfire
against the prosecutor when the jurors' unrealistic expectations are not met.
Considering the no-holds-barred attitudes fueled by the "wars" on drugs,
crime, and now terrorism, it is unsurprising that prosecutors feel it
necessary to solve major crimes quickly and publicly. This pressure is
exacerbated by extremely large caseloads in urban jurisdictions, coupled
with inevitable funding shortfalls. When the evidence demonstrates
probable cause but is not convincing without an added bounce from a
52. See Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind "24," New
Yorker, Feb. 19, 2007, at 66.
53. Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2001) ("What
emerges from this record is an intent to secure a conviction of murder even at the cost of
condoning perjury. This record emits clear overtones of the Machiavellian maxim: 'the end
justifies the means,' an idea that is plainly incompatible with our constitutional concept of
ordered liberty." (citation omitted)).
54. My writings concerning domestic violence, child abuse, and the Confrontation
Clause have tried to address this tension. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child
Abuse Litigation in a "Testimonial" World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and
Confrontation, 82 Ind. L.J. 1009 (2007); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After
Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full, 15 J.L. & Pol'y 759 (2007); Myrna S. Raeder,
Domestic Violence in Federal Court: Abused Women as Victims, Survivors, and Offenders,
19 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 91 (2006); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker
Federal Guidelines World, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 691 (2006); Myrna S. Raeder,
Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, Crim. Just., Spring 2007, at 10.
55. See, e.g., Gary C. Williams, Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility for
the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 829, 840 (2001) (discussing that over one
hundred convictions have been reversed due to police planting of evidence and perjury).
56. See generally Michael Mann, The "CSI Effect": Better Jurors Through Television
and Science?, 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 211 (2006).
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jailhouse informant or overly helpful expert, is it any wonder that
prosecutors leave it to the jury to decide if they got the wrong person? Such
witnesses also take the pressure off of law enforcement to fully investigate
cases, the vast majority of which will not result in trial. Yet this Faustian
bargain imposes the terrible cost of making police and prosecutors lazy in
both their investigation and prosecution of the case, which increases the
potential for a wrongful conviction when the lying witnesses are believed,
and the other evidence is weak.
Elections for local district attorneys add another consideration, since win-
loss records tend to dominate the media, as does a high-profile defeat. Even
within a prosecutor's office, advancement may depend on a high conviction
rate. 57 Yet, when a prosecutor took an unpopular, but ethically principled
stance, and moved for dismissal of a high-profile case because his office
believed that the circumstantial evidence was not strong enough to satisfy
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge was unwilling to comply, and
the jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, which was upheld on appeal. 58
This outcome reinforces the view that when the crimes are heinous and
involve serial killings, public safety concerns and public perception require
the trial of questionable cases.
As has been aptly described by other commentators, much of the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct relates to "activities that the codes refer to only
obliquely, if at all."' 59 This helps to explain the paucity of cases in which
prosecutors are disciplined. Another reason for the scarcity of cases where
prosecutors are disciplined is the absence of complaints, which tend to be
filed primarily in high-profile cases or because of written opinions
documenting the misconduct. 60 In addition, misconduct may be monitored
by prosecutorial agencies, judges, and the ballot box, 6 1 with uneven results.
Many believe that bar discipline is ineffective to deter prosecutorial
misconduct 6 2 and suggest other remedies, such as rethinking absolute
prosecutorial immunity, 63 establishing independent commissions, 64 or even
57. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 134-35 (2004).
58. Then-Los Angeles District Attorney John Van de Kamp approved dismissal of the
"Hillside Strangler" case due to the perceived untrustworthiness of evidence from the
coconspirator who was to be the main prosecution witness. The judge, Ronald George, now
chief justice of the Supreme Court of California, refused to enter the dismissal. The
California attorney general's office took over the prosecution of the case and obtained the
defendant's conviction. See Justice Roger W. Boren, The Hillside Strangler Trial, 33 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 707, 720, 724 (2000).
59. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 721,
735 (2001).
60. Id. at 749-50.
61. Id. at 763-65.
62. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. Rev. 275, 276 (2004) ("[T]he lack of accountability for such
misconduct is typical and cannot be blamed upon a lack of enforceable standards governing
the behavior of prosecutors.").




employing criminal sanctions.65 Indeed, the disbarment of Michael Nifong
after the Duke rape case was highly unusual and involved violations of
specific obligations concerning Brady and press conferences, as well as
claims regarding more discretionary activities. Moreover, Nifong not only
admitted his fault at the hearing, but the investigation was also fueled by a
firestorm of publicity focusing on the sympathetic defendants, one of whom
appeared to have a strong alibi.6 6 In contrast, the complainant made many
contradictory statements and virtually no corroboration existed for her
account of what happened, other than statements of a nurse who indicated
that the complainant's behavior was consistent with that of a rape victim.
Can anyone doubt that if public sentiment had been against the defendants,
and if their cases had not been dismissed by a different prosecutorial
agency, the swift response by the North Carolina State Bar and the resulting
disbarment would have been unlikely?6 7 In fact, a Chicago Tribune study
analyzed 381 murder cases that were reversed because of prosecutorial
misconduct and found that none of the prosecutors were disbarred. 68
Except for a perfect storm like the Duke case, it is impractical to assume
that disciplinary hearings provide a practical remedy for misconduct. The
parents of the Duke defendants were reported to have spent $3 million on
legal advice during the pendency of the case. 6 9 As defendant Reade
Seligmann explained,
"This entire experience has opened my eyes up to a tragic world of
injustice I never knew existed.... If police officers and a district attorney
can systematically railroad us with absolutely no evidence whatsoever, I
can't imagine what they'd do to people who do not have the resources to
defend themselves. So rather than relying on disparaging stereotypes and
creating political and racial conflicts, all of us need to take a step back
from this case and learn from it.["]70
64. Yaroshefsky, supra note 62, at 297-98 (concluding that it is necessary to establish
an independent commission to examine wrongful cases and to promulgate, implement, and
enforce disciplinary rules for prosecutors).
65. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Who Is Keeping the Gate? What Do We Do When
Prosecutors Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They Have Sworn to Uphold?, 47 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 801, 826-47 (2006).
66. See Duff Wilson & David Barstow, Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against
Players, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2007, at Al; see also Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse
Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice," 76
Fordham L. Rev. 1337 (2007) (discussing the ethical violations and subsequent disbarment
of Michael Nifong in great detail).
67. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2007, at
WK4 (claiming that the same factors that were a huge publicity magnet for his reelection led
to his undoing in the court of public opinion when the case collapsed).
68. Id.
69. Anne Blythe & Joseph Neff, About $750,000 Raised: Group Helping Cover Duke
Players' Bills, Defendant's Father Says $3 Million Spent So Far, Charlotte Observer (N.C.),
Feb. 6, 2007, at 5B.
70. Wilson & Barstow, supra note 66.
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Yet the high-profile disciplinary proceeding has the practical benefit of
making the public understand when a prosecutor's conduct is unacceptable.
Moreover, it reinforces the ethical precepts by which prosecutors are bound.
Indeed, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) felt it
necessary to issue several press releases in the wake of the disbarment. One
described the false accusations of rape by members of the Duke lacrosse
team as "abhorrent, dishonest, and self-serving, and fly[ing] in the face of
the ethical conduct that prosecutors not only accept and endorse, but adhere
to." 7 ! The release also recognized,
No prosecutor wants to subject an innocent person to prosecution. This is
a nightmare scenario for every prosecutor. In millions of cases and trials
prosecutors go to great lengths to investigate, use DNA evidence if
available, talk to witnesses and use every law enforcement tool available
to them before they make a decision to charge a suspect. To do less
would be intolerable. 72  I
Another release by the NDAA specifically addressed the ethical
implications of the case: "The recent case of the exonerated athletes in
North Carolina has affirmed the importance of the ethical standards of
America's prosecutors and serves as a reminder that the primary ethical
duty of a prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. '73
That press release also recognized that "[t]he confidence of the public
and the very integrity of the criminal justice process depend on strict
compliance with these ethical standards." 74 Thus, even the atypical resort
to disciplinary proceedings may have an impact on prosecutors, as well as
give the public an appreciation of their ethical responsibilities that rarely
appear in the popular media. At a minimum, it also signals to prosecutors
that the ethical rules matter, even if typically honored in the breach, when
the defendant's innocence is a realistic possibility. In other words, the
ethics-lite approach to prosecutorial misconduct sometimes packs an
unexpected punch.
71. Press Release, Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n, There Is Not an Epidemic of Rogue
Prosecutors in America: A Statement to Americans by the National District Attorneys
Association (June 17, 2007),
http://www.ndaa.org/newsroom/pr-dukecase-june 17 07.html.
72. Id.; see also Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-
Tech Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1453,
1473-85 (2007) (discussing the ethical questions that DNA evidence poses to prosecutors
with particular reference to the Duke lacrosse case).
73. Press Release, Nat'l District Att'ys Ass'n, National District Attorneys Association's
President Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Issues Statement Concerning the North Carolina-Duke Case




111. Do THE ETHICAL RULES PROHIBIT THE USE OF JAILHOUSE
INFORMANTS AND DISHONEST EXPERTS, AND EVEN IF THE ANSWER IS YES,
CAN A CONVICTION BE REVERSED FOR VIOLATING THAT
ETHICAL OBLIGATION?
A. The Obligation to Seek Justice
Berger v. United States75 is always the starting point for any discussion
of prosecutorial ethics. While some claim Berger's vague ethical standard
is simply aspirational, Berger recognizes that prosecutors' fealty to justice
includes a duty to avoid conduct likely to result in wrongful convictions:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 76
The Court also chastised the trial judge for not taking stronger measures
to deter the prosecutor's trial tactics. 77 Berger is still frequently cited, 78
typically in hortatory form. Expanding on Berger's theme, Justice
Douglas's dissenting opinion in Donnelly v. DiChristoforo79 asserted, "The
function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as
many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate
the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime
a fair trial."'80
More recently, Banks v. Dretke8 l reiterated,
We have several times underscored the "special role played by the
American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.". . . Courts,
litigants, and juries properly anticipate that "obligations [to refrain from
improper methods to secure a conviction] ... plainly rest[ing] upon the
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed." Prosecutors' dishonest
conduct.., should attract no judicial approbation. 8 2
75. 295 U.S. 78 (1935), overruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212 (1960).
76. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
77. Id. at 85.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993).
79. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
80. Id. at 648-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
82. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
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Banks also alluded to the ethical dimensions of prosecution when it
further advised that "[t]he prudence of the careful prosecutor should not...
be discouraged. '8 3 In United States v. LaPage,84 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reminded prosecutors that they have "a special duty
commensurate with a prosecutor's unique power, to assure that defendants
receive fair trials." 85 The court explained "perjury pollutes a trial, making
it hard for jurors to see the truth."'86 Similarly, Judge Alex Kozinski, in
United States v. Kojayan,87 explained the role prosecutorial ethics play in
the criminal justice system as follows:
The overwhelming majority of prosecutors are decent, ethical, honorable
lawyers who understand the awesome power they wield, and the
responsibility that goes with it. But the temptation is always there: It's
the easiest thing in the world for people trained in the adversarial ethic to
think a prosecutor's job is simply to win. 88
Therefore, he explained that "[o]ne of the most important responsibilities of
the United States Attorney and his senior deputies is ensuring that line
attorneys are aware of the special ethical responsibilities of prosecutors, and
that they resist the temptation to overreach. '8 9 Commentators also have
recognized Berger's importance in obtaining fair trials. For example,
Professor Bennett L. Gershman characterized Berger's duty as including
"the avoidance of conduct that deliberately corrupts the truth-finding
process," referring to Berger's depiction of the prosecutor's conduct as an
"evil influence" that was "calculated to mislead the jury."9 0  Berger's
exhortation that prosecutors should take the high road is also critical
because of their many undefined or ambiguous ethical responsibilities. 9 1
Indeed, Professor Bruce A. Green has complained that the ethics rules
binding prosecutors are "woefully incomplete." 92  Moreover, the
admonition to do justice may have a different meaning at trial than at the
charging phase, due to the potentially conflicting obligation of prosecutors
83. Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995)).
84. 231 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 2000).
85. Id. at 492.
86. Id.
87. 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993).
88. Id. at 1324.
89. Id.
90. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 309,
317 (2001) [hereinafter Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty] (quoting Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935)).
91. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 445
(1992) (discussing that standards for prosecutors are "often so nebulous as to be
unenforceable"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. Il1. L. Rev. 1573,
1596; Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 553 (1999).
92. Green, supra note 91, at 1597.
1428 [Vol. 76
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
to be advocates in an adversarial system of justice, as well as ministers of
justice. 93
B. The Specific Ethical Rules and Standards
The ethical rules governing the solicitation and presentation ofjailhouse
informants and dishonest experts are equally abstract. Model Rule 3.8 is
the only rule that specifically addresses the special responsibilities of a
prosecutor. 94 Yet the text of that Rule does not address these topics. Only
the comments accompanying the Rule mention the overarching principle of
prosecutorial ethics, describing the prosecutor's role as that of "a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate," including "specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." 95  Similarly, the
ABA's Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution Function provide that
the "duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. '96 The
NDAA has also published Prosecution Standards that exhort prosecutors
always to be "vigilant when the accused may be innocent. '97 There is also
a U.S. Attorneys' Manual, 98 as well as regulations governing federal
prosecutors, who are now subject to state ethical rules.99
Several of the rules directed to all lawyers are relevant to solicitation and
presentation ofjailhouse informants and dishonest experts, though none are
ultimately up to the task of providing prosecutors with bright lines about
their specific obligations concerning these highly suspect witnesses. For
example, Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.100 It is also professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."''1 1
Yet the comments to this rule give no hint of its potential reach in the
context of prosecutorial obligations concerning the employment of
witnesses who may be lying. Practically, the rule is unlikely to provide
additional constraints to the existing directives that prohibit all lawyers
from knowingly "mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal" or
93. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 89 (1991) ("Although prosecutors may
aggressively advocate their interpretations of the evidence, they share a responsibility for
assuring that the evidence itself is of the type jurors in the adversary system may rely on.").
94. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 (2003).
95. Id. R. 3.8 cmt. I.
96. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function
Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993).
97. National Prosecution Standards § 68.4 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n, 2d ed. 1991); see
also id. § 1.1 ("[T]he primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to see that justice is
accomplished.").
98. See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual (2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/ [hereinafter USAM].
99. See Citizens Protection Act (McDade Amendment), 28 U.S.C. § 530(B) (1998).
100. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 8.4(c).
101. Id. R. 8.4(d).
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"offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." 102 "Knowing" in
this context is defined differently than belief, 10 3 setting a high barrier to
applying the rule.
Similarly, a lawyer shall not "falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness
to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by
law."' 104 The Rules make no mention of the propriety of compensating
cooperating witnesses. Indeed, an attorney who specializes in complex
criminal litigation interprets the comments to the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards as "appear[ing] to prohibit compensation in the form of lenient
treatment in exchange for cooperation, at least where the cooperation is on a
matter unrelated to the cooperator's criminal exposure."' 1 5 Judge Richard
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has called
paying for testimony a breach of prosecutorial ethics, "irregular and, in fact,
unlawful in federal trials," while recognizing that "immunity from
prosecution, a lighter sentence, placement in a witness-protection program,
and other breaks are lawful coin in this realm."' 1 6 Judge Frank Easterbrook
has also noted that the "exchange of money for information may be a
regrettable way of securing evidence, but it is common."']07
As the courts are loath to find that jailhouse informants are government
agents, it is not always clear when dealing with jailhouse informants
triggers Model Rule 4.2's prohibition of contact with represented
witnesses. 10 8 The Department of Justice has detailed rules governing the
use of confidential informants (CI), 109 but they define a CI as an informant
from whom the government expects or intends to obtain additional useful
and credible information regarding felonious activities in the future."10
Thus, unless a CI is placed in the defendant's cell, these policies would not
cover most jailhouse informants who simply claim the good fortune of
having obtained a one-time confession. However, the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual specifically addresses the use of individuals in custody for
102. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1), (3).
103. Compare id. R. 1.0(f) (stating that "knowingly" requires actual knowledge), with id.
R. 1.0(a) (stating that "belief' denotes supposing the fact to be true).
104. Id. R. 3.4(b).
105. Harris, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution
Function and Defense Function Standard 3-3.1 cmt. (3d ed. 1993)).
106. Mataya v. Kingston, 371 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). See
generally Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: Can Prosecutors Buy Testimony?, Champion, May
2005, at 55 [hereinafter Tarlow, Buy Testimony].
107. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994).
108. See, e.g., United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a
jailhouse informant is not a government agent, despite entering into a cooperation agreement
to inform and having his cell block switched, because the target was not identified). See
generally Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: Silence May Not Be Golden, Jailhouse Informers
and the Right to Counsel, Champion, Oct. 2005, at 58, 63-64 [hereinafter Tarlow, Silence].
109. John Ashcroft, The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the use of Confidential
Informants (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/dojguidelines.pdf.
110. Id. at 2.
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investigative purposes. I ' Federal permission to use jailhouse informants
requires federal prosecutors to provide details as to "[w]hether or not the
cooperating individual is represented by counsel and, if so, an
acknowledgement by the agency that the counsel concurs with his or her
client's participation in this activity," as well as "[w]hether or not the
cooperating individual is facing pending criminal charges."' 12 In addition,
the request must include an acknowledgement by the agency that the
planned operation does not violate the attorney general's "Contact with
Represented Persons" guidelines 113 with regard to either the cooperating
individual or any target(s) or other persons to be contacted during this
operation.11 4 However, the contact rule only governs communications with
represented persons about the subject matter for which they are represented.
A weakness of the federal informant policies is that they give little
ethical guidance to prosecutors about how to determine whether to employ
an informant. Instead, most of the detail relates to procedure after an
informant is designated. Professor David A. Sklansky has condemned the
Department of Justice's failure to include the degree of confidence that the
witness will testify honestly in its criteria for evaluating plea agreements for
cooperating defendants." 5 According to Sklansky, the current criteria send
a clear message "that credibility is important solely for determining how
helpful the cooperation will be; the concern is less with truth than with
forensic efficacy." 116 Surprisingly, neither the ABA nor the NDAA
Standards provide any guidance concerning the employment and use of
jailhouse or other informants, a significant gap that leaves prosecutors to
their discretion concerning the very topic that begs for supervision from
their most experienced colleagues. It is clear that both standards should be
revised to include informants.
Barry Tarlow, a well-respected criminal defense attorney, has written
about his success in deterring introduction ofjailhouse informant testimony.
Tarlow sends the prosecutor a letter signed by the client, which summarizes
the evidence available in the public record, describes the propensity of
jailhouse informants to fabricate confessions, and indicates that the
11l. USAM, supra note 98, § 9-21.050 (requiring the approval of the Office of Enforcement
Operations), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/2 1 mcrm.htm#9-
21.050.
112. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 703(12) (1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/tite9/crmOO703.htm [hereinafter
Criminal Resource Manual].
113. See USAM, supra note 98, § 9-13.200,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading-room/usam/title9/13mcrm.htm#9-13.200
(encouraging consultation with professional responsibility officers). See generally Criminal
Resource Manual, supra note 112, § 296(D), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00296.htm.
114. Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 112, § 703(15).
115. David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 Fordham Urb.





information has been reviewed by the client, highlighting the suspect nature
of any later jailhouse confession. 117 Tarlow also reminds the prosecutor of
"his ethical duty not to communicate, either directly or indirectly through
an informer, with the defendant without defense counsel's consent." 1 18 In
other words, a lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this
Rule through the acts of another. 119
Similarly, little specific guidance is directed to the use of experts. The
Prosecution Function Standards state that a prosecutor "should respect the
independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of
the expert's opinion on the subject,"' 120 and "should not pay an excessive
fee for the purpose of influencing the expert's testimony or to fix the
amount of the fee contingent upon the testimony the expert will give or the
result in the case." 121 The payment of experts is approved in comment 3 to
Model Rule 3.4, which indicates that compensation of experts is typically
permitted, unless the expert has been offered a contingency fee. 122
Professor Jane Campbell Moriarty views experts from the FBI crime lab as
neither "independent" nor "impartial," since they assist only law
enforcement. 123 Professor Gershman further suggests that the symbiotic
nature of the relationship between prosecutors and their experts makes it
almost certain that scripting and coaching occurs frequently. 124 In a system
where most forensic laboratories are operated by law enforcement, it is
difficult to suggest that an expert's employment by a law enforcement
agency makes his or her testimony ethically suspect in the abstract. In
specific cases, however, the interaction between law enforcement and the
expert will undoubtedly render the opinion suspect. Indeed, it might be
warranted to shift the burden to the prosecution to demonstrate such
testimony satisfies the ethical rules rather than to assume that it does.
Finally, the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA is currently considering
two new sections to Rule 3.8, which would specifically address the
obligations of prosecutors in cases that raise the specter of wrongful
conviction. Even if adopted, these sections focus on cooperation in
obtaining postconviction relief, not the solicitation of evidence prior to trial
or its offer during trial. 125
117. See Tarlow, Silence, supra note 108, at 69.
118. Id.
119. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(a) (2003).
120. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function
Standard 3-3.3(a) (3d ed. 1993). The NDAA does not have a similar rule.
121. Id. § 3-3.3(b).
122. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (2003).
123. Moriarty, supra note 12, at 24.
124. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 10, at 31.
125. Proposed Model Rule 3.8(g) would govern cases where there is "a reasonable
probability that [a convicted defendant] did not commit the offense," while Rule 3.8(h)
would govern cases involving "clear and convincing evidence" of a wrongful conviction.
The provisions are based on revisions adopted by local bar associations in New York. See
Comm. on Prof I Responsibility, Proposed Prosecutorial Ethics Rules, 61 Record 69 (2006),
available at http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/record/vol-61-no I.pdf.
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C. The Case Law
There is a dearth of cases directed specifically at the ethics of using
jailhouse informants and dubious experts when no Brady claim is involved.
Cases generally discussing Rule 3.8 recognize that a prosecutor's conduct
need not violate a defendant's constitutional right to subject the prosecutor
to discipline. 126  Disciplinary complaints usually are filed alleging
violations of the specific mandates contained in the ethical rules. Penalties
are rarely, if ever, meted out for violations of broad aspirational goals or
ambiguous rules. In contrast, the criminal case law focuses on whether the
defendant's conviction should be overturned, which depends on the
violation of constitutional constraints that often overlap with ethical
precepts. As a result, the discussion of ethics is folded into the
constitutional analysis, making it sometimes difficult to determine if a
higher ethical duty is overlooked because of its irrelevance to the ultimate
determination. The overlap can be seen in such cases as Mooney v.
Holohan,127 which recognized that contriving "a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of ... deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
perjured... is ... inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice,"' 28
and results in a violation of due process. Later cases held that a prosecutor
must correct false evidence whenever it appears. 129
However, if no prejudice occurs, such as when the jury knows the
witness was inconsistent and other evidence supports the verdict, the
conviction will be affirmed, even in the presence of the ethical violation. 130
Thus, the answer to whether a freestanding ethical obligation requires a
reversal is a resounding no, even when it is clear that a specific obligation,
rather than merely an aspirational precept, is violated. In a heartfelt dissent
in Darden v. Wainwright,13 1 Justice Harry Blackmun protested such a
result concerning improper jury selection in a capital case: "I believe this
Court must do more than wring its hands when a State... permits
prosecutors to pervert the adversary process."' 32  Because the need to
126. See cases cited in Ctr. for Prof I Responsibility, Am. Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model
Rules of Prof'l Conduct 395-96 (5th ed. 2003).
127. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
128. Id. at 112.
129. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959); United States v. Alli, 344
F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, regardless of any objection by defense counsel
and the full disclosure of Brady/Giglio evidence, prosecution must step forward and correct
known false or misleading statements in open court). See generally Tarlow, Buy Testimony,
supra note 106.
130. See, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735-36, 744 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 957 (2007).
131. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
132. Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183,
186-87, 192 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming conviction where prosecutorial misconduct was
alleged in closing argument because the jury would have likely convicted without the
remarks, although the primary witness was a jailhouse informant with "a prodigious criminal
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demonstrate a reversible constitutional error downplays the significance of
ethical references, the force of any stinging rebuke to prosecutors in such
decisions is lost. In other words, if the conviction is confirmed, a
prosecutor who only cares about winning might view the ethical reproach
from the perspective of no harm, no foul-particularly when no disciplinary
sanctions are imposed.
In a few cases, the ethical and legal violations are sufficient to withstand
the harmless error standard of review or claimed lack of prejudice or
materiality. For example, Judge Trott has written two widely quoted
opinions about the duty of a prosecutor who suspects perjury. 133 Though
much of his discussion involved lying informants who were not necessarily
jailhouse informants, his words apply even more forcefully in our context.
In Judge Trott's view, the "freestanding ethical and constitutional
obligation of the prosecutor as a representative of the government to protect
the integrity of the court and the criminal justice system, [is] established in
Mooney and Berger."134 Moreover, he explained that the prosecutor's duty
requires action when put on notice of the "real possibility of false
testimony." 135
In Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, Judge Trott noted that the duty to
act "is not discharged by attempting to finesse the problem by pressing
ahead without a diligent and a good faith attempt to resolve it. A prosecutor
cannot avoid this obligation by refusing to search for the truth and
remaining willfully ignorant of the facts." 136 The Bowie court, deeming
investigation of a witness's credibility to be a routine prosecutorial task,
held that due process demanded that the prosecutor "guard against the
corruption of the system caused by fraud on the court by taking whatever
action is reasonably appropriate given the circumstances of each case." 137
Similarly, in United States v. Bernal-Obeso, Judge Trott aptly described
the responsibilities of prosecutors who employ cooperating witnesses:
By definition, criminal informants are cut from untrustworthy cloth and
must be ... carefully watched by the government ... to prevent them
from falsely accusing the innocent.., and from lying under oath in the
courtroom .... Because the government decides whether and when to
use such witnesses, and what, if anything, to give them for their service,
the government stands uniquely positioned to guard against perfidy. By
its actions, the government can either contribute to or eliminate the
record-including numerous armed robberies, several carjackings and attempted murders,
and two arsons-[who] once gave perjured testimony in an attempted murder trial").
133. See generally, Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1993). These opinions are discussed
by Barry Tarlow in RICO Report, The Highwayman Visits the Marianas: Informers Beware,
Champion, May 2006, at 58.
134. Bowie, 243 F.3d at 1122 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 1118.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1125.
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problem. Accordingly, we expect prosecutors and investigators to take all
reasonable measures to safeguard the system against treachery.] 38
Walker v. City of New York 139 "illustrates the disastrous consequences
that can follow when this responsibility is not met."' 140 The prosecutors in
Walker persisted in prosecuting a defendant, lying and concealing evidence
in the process, even though they were aware of his probable innocence.
Walker actually involved a civil suit brought pursuant to § 1983 that was
permitted to proceed on the theory that the municipality failed to train its
officers not to commit perjury in order to obtain conviction, and failed to
train its assistant district attorneys in their Brady obligations. 14 1
D. The Prudent Prosecutor
In United States v. Agurs, 14 2 the Supreme Court counseled that "the
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure,"' 143 concerning its examination of when exculpatory evidence
must be disclosed. One commentator has argued that this suggests ethical
prosecutors should "resolv[e] uncertainties in favor of protecting the
constitutional rights of the criminal defendant."'144 Taking this view would
arguably render many of the decisions to utilize jailhouse informants and
dishonest experts unethical even under the present ethical rules. For
example, Professor Gershman concludes that the extensive documentation
of wrongful convictions should prompt prosecutors to assume the role of
informal gatekeepers to screen doubtful cases from the jury. 14 5 He warns
that prosecutors should not assume witnesses are telling the truth or that the
forensic evidence is accurate. 146 This is particularly true of jailhouse
informants' confessions, which are made "under the most incredible
circumstances but are presented at trial to look like public-spirited citizens
doing their duty to truth and justice."' 147
This cautious perspective reveals the ethical quagmire surrounding the
use of jailhouse informants as witnesses. Obviously, the long history of
lying jailhouse informants puts prosecutors on notice that jailhouse
138. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333-34.
139. 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
140. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. Walker, 974 F.2d at 301; see also Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170,
1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying absolute immunity in a § 1983 action to prosecutors who
failed to institute an information-sharing system regarding jailhouse informants and failed to
adequately train or supervise deputies regarding the use of informants). The Goldstein suit
was brought after a defendant was released for wrongful conviction of murder. Id.
142. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
143. Id. at 108.
144. Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the
Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice " in a Comparative Analytical Framework,
41 Hous. L. Rev. 1337, 1356 (2004).
145. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 90, at 341.
146. Id. at 342.
147. Id. at 346.
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informants may not be truthful. 148 The Center on Wrongful Convictions
identifies an 1819 case as the first documented wrongful conviction. The
case involved a cell mate who claimed the defendant confessed and who
was given his freedom in exchange for the testimony that led to a death
sentence. In a fortuitous twist of fate, the alleged victim turned up alive
before the execution. 149 Yet courts have taken a hands-off attitude toward
this type of dubious testimony. The courts generally consider the issue to
be one of credibility for the jury, rather than admissibility, unless the
perjury is undeniable or Brady disclosure obligations are implicated. Thus,
prosecutors are rarely taken to task for their rampant employment of
jailhouse informants in otherwise weak cases. On the other hand, although
arguing for a cautious approach reflects the real danger that jailhouse
informant testimony is a tissue of lies, it is unlikely that 100% of the
jailhouse informants are lying, even if the literature suggests that the
majority are. Somewhat like the blue bus and rodeo hypotheticals that
evidence professors pose to students concerning the use of naked
probabilities in deciding cases, 150 the underlying issue is which side, the
prosecution or the defense, should bear the burden of demonstrating that
this particular informant is telling the truth.
The litany of evils associated with the unfettered use of jailhouse
informants includes claims that the testimony is perjured, that the
prosecutor knows it is false and violated his Brady disclosure obligations,
that the use of the jailhouse informant was a backdoor violation of Model
Rule 4.2 and Massiah v. United States, that the corroboration of the
jailhouse informant was insufficient, and that the cautionary instruction was
not given or was inadequate. 151  In contrast, the benefit of jailhouse
informant testimony is the potential of a hard-to-win conviction that will
stand despite the claimed defects. Of course, the decades of litigation that
will inevitably follow the successful introduction of jailhouse informant
testimony may serve as a constant reminder that more investigation might
have provided clearer evidence of guilt or innocence, and ultimately proved
less costly and more professional. In this context, it is critical to adopt
ethical rules that act as a yellow light, cautioning prosecutors to stop and
think before risking a disaster. Not only should restricting the use of
148. See Bloom, supra note 8, at 22-24.
149. Northwestern, supra note 1, at 2.
150. The blue bus hypothetical assumes the only evidence that the defendant's bus injured
the plaintiff is that it owns a majority of the blue buses in town and that the plaintiff was
injured by a blue bus. The rodeo hypothetical assumes that a random member of the
audience at a rodeo is sued for not paying his ticket in a situation where the majority of
spectators had not. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of
Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 385, 395-97 (1985);
Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 986 (2006).
151. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (holding that after a defendant is
indicted and has retained counsel, incriminating statements elicited by government agents in
the absence of counsel are inadmissible). A minority of states have enacted a corroboration
requirement. See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 70.
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jailhouse informant testimony in a principled manner be an acceptable goal
for ethical prosecutors, it should also be a welcome one.
Given the empirical data suggesting that jailhouse informants are
untrustworthy, prudence would dictate that the burden of proving the
jailhouse informant's truthfulness should be on prosecutors as a matter of
ethical practice, not simply admissibility. Prosecutors know the previous
history of the informant, as well as the benefits either offered to or
reasonably assumed by the jailhouse informant, and have a better ability to
corroborate and to test veracity, even if by methods not admissible at
trial. 152 Thus, it logically follows that prosecutors should have the ethical
obligation to refrain from using this type of witness unless they can
affirmatively show that the particular jailhouse informant is truthful. Judge
Trott would even require that jailhouse confessions be considered "false
until the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt,"'153 a much more
stringent test than the standard generally employed for such preliminary
factual determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence. 154 Such
heightened scrutiny ensures that prosecutors cannot avoid their obligation
by "remaining willfully ignorant of the facts."'15 5  Even with these
restrictions, prosecutors would still be able to employ jailhouse informants
when the need is great and the factors support a reasonable belief that the
jailhouse informant is telling the truth. But this type of review would sound
the death knell for the unfettered use ofjailhouse informants.
Not only would this interpretation better ensure the integrity of criminal
trials, but it also undoubtedly would reduce the numerous complaints that
too many prosecutors are violating their Brady obligations concerning
jailhouse informants, whether by inadvertence or design. Thus, ethical
practice would benefit, the reputation of prosecutors would be enhanced,
and a significant cause of wrongful convictions would be greatly
diminished. However, the current rules do not appear to mandate such an
interpretation. Therefore, assuming appropriate Brady/Napue 56 disclosures
and no overt indication of fabrication, the solicitation and presentation of
jailhouse informant testimony is currently not likely to be a per se, or
arguably not even a specific, ethical violation. Even under the prudent
prosecutor approach it would not be a per se ethical breach, though
prosecutors could be more readily shown to have ethical feet of clay in
specific cases. Therefore, a revision to the rules, and to the ABA and
152. For example, prosecutors routinely use polygraphs for investigative purposes,
although the evidence is not typically admissible at trial. In this regard, a finding that the
jailhouse informant is lying should disqualify him because the risk he is actually lying is so
great. In contrast, a finding of truthfulness should not automatically qualify the jailhouse
informant in light of other factors, such as a previous perjury conviction or lack of strong
corroboration.
153. Trott, supra note 24, at 1394.
154. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
155. Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001).
156. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (holding that a prosecutor must correct false
testimony that affects the witness's credibility).
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NDAA Standards should be adopted that would require prosecutors to
refrain from introducing the testimony of jailhouse informants unless they
can point to specific factors justifying the truthfulness of the particular
witness. In addition, the establishment of explicit criteria, and an internal
review process to approve the use of jailhouse informants should be
required. The Los Angeles district attorney's office dramatically cut its use
of jailhouse informants by adopting such an approach, without an outright
ban on such witnesses. 157
Moreover, as Judge Trott has often reminded prosecutors, one of the
perils of using seamy witnesses is that they will also color the jury's view
of the prosecutor and his or her case. This suggests both that the prosecutor
should corroborate everything these witnesses say and, in some cases,
simply use the jailhouse informant as an investigative source to develop
better evidence for trial. 158 Of course, this is a tactical, rather than ethical,
reason for taking the high road. However, it points out that prosecutors
may be unnecessarily putting their reputations on the line when they
mindlessly offer jailhouse informant testimony. Can anyone doubt that the
prosecutor who called eight jailhouse informants to testify to the
defendant's confessions at one preliminary hearing 159 had crossed the
ethical line? Is it really arguable that prosecutors do not know that
jailhouse informants who repeatedly claim they obtained confessions are
likely to be fabricating? Clearly, the prophylactic value of self-regulation is
a significant advantage to an ethical, rather than a legal, approach to the
admission ofjailhouse informant testimony. Leaving the decision to judges
who apply evidentiary rules that favor admissibility has not enhanced the
reputation of either prosecutors or more generally the criminal justice
system.
Similarly, regarding the testimony of experts, Professor Michael J. Saks
argues that if prosecutors are only prohibited from offering evidence known
to be false, attorneys would be rewarded for not learning anything about the
underlying basis of the expertise. 160 Because this would conflict with the
obligation of prosecutors to do justice, Saks posits that before introducing
expert testimony, the prosecutor should be required to have reasonable good
faith belief that he or she could make a well-grounded showing that the
expertise satisfies the "relevant validity criteria.' 161 However, it has also
157. See CCFAJ Report, supra note 7, at 3; see also infra notes 244-54.
158. See Trott, supra note 24, at 1382, 1394, 1425.
159. County of L.A., Cal., 1989-90 Los Angeles Grand Jury: Investigation of the
Involvement of Jail House Informants in the Criminal Justice System in Los Angeles County
38 (1990) [hereinafter Grand Jury Report], available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/expert/1989-
1990%20LA%20County%20Grand%2OJury%20Report.pdf.
160. Saks, supra note 12, at 427; see also David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses and the
Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert's
Testimony?, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 341, 347-48 (2003) (discussing whether there is a duty to
confirm suspicions that the expertise is false).
161. Saks, supra note 12, at 428.
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been suggested that "[a]ny analysis of the ethical responsibilities of lawyers
to evaluate their expert's testimony must take into account the complexities
and uncertainty of scientific knowledge." 162 Again, the question arises as
to whether the expert's pattern of finding questionable results should put the
prosecutor on notice of the likely falsity of the evidence. For example, the
investigation of the failings of the Houston laboratory found that the
serology work that the crime lab performed during the 1980 to 1992 period
was "generally unreliable," with errors in twenty-one percent of the
serology cases reviewed that related to a defendant who is currently in
prison. 163 The report concluded that "[t]his is an extraordinarily high and
extremely disturbing proportion of cases in which to find problems of this
magnitude."' 164 The report also referenced that DNA was analyzed "under
conditions that made the risk of an injustice intolerably high."'1 65
For our purposes, the question is whether such poor results were known
by prosecutors. The data indicates a willful blindness to the inaccuracy of
the expert testimony being offered in criminal cases. Professor Gershman
argues that "many prosecutors are fully aware that ... laborator[ies] have
been engaging in a long-standing practice and pattern of misconduct.' '166
Thus, he finds the claim of ignorance of the misconduct by prosecutors
"often is plainly incredible,"' 167 and should not provide an excuse when
prosecutors regularly use scientific experts who are "notorious for
incompetence and dishonesty."'168 I agree that willful blindness should not
provide an ethical pass. However, I do not believe that the current language
of the rules satisfactorily covers this type of misconduct. Therefore, the
rules or standards should be modified to provide that a clear pattern of
inaccurate laboratory results is adequate to supply knowledge that the
testimony in an individual case is likely to be false or misleading.
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT ENCOURAGE
HIGH STANDARDS OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
A. The Constitutional Framework for Reversals and Monetary Relief
Currently, neither the constitutional framework for obtaining reversals of
criminal convictions, nor any potential civil remedies provides sufficient
incentives for prosecutors to be prudent when they consider employing
jailhouse informants or dishonest experts. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has been a significant part of the problem, not the solution. In order
162. Caudill, supra note 160, at 353.
163. Michael R. Bromwich, Final Report of the Independent Investigator for the Houston
Police Department Crime Laboratory and Property Room 114 (2004), available at
http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/070613report.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 151.
166. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 10, at 26-27.
167. Id. at 26.
168. Id. at 27.
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for the jury-based system to remain afloat, finality of judgments is a clear
necessity. Yet DNA testing has recently disabused the system from its
notion that there is no legitimate way to second-guess the accuracy of the
jury's verdict. 169 The finality doctrine helps explain the restrictions on
habeas corpus litigation, presumptions on appeal that favor jury verdicts,
and the general requirement that reversals are saved for errors that are
material, prejudicial, and not harmless,170 except in rare instances when the
error is so basic that it is considered structural. Moreover, due process and
other constitutional rights tend to provide a floor dictating what is
minimally acceptable, rather than a ceiling covering what would be
desirable. For example, even the introduction of perjured testimony does
not automatically require a new trial.171 Thus, while claims of prosecutorial
misconduct are common, reversals are not assured, even when the conduct
is clearly unethical. Arguably, this appellate reality encourages winning at
any cost, because ethics do not appear to affect outcomes at the courthouse,
let alone at the polling place, where Michael Nifong was reelected prior to
being disbarred. Practically, prosecutors who overreach in order to obtain
convictions have little fear from the courts other than a proverbial slap on
the wrist in a judicial opinion, which in current practice may not even lead
to a disciplinary investigation. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
the Center for Public Integrity has discovered that some prosecutors are
recidivists when it comes to ethical misconduct, even when repeatedly
chastised in written decisions. 172
Calderon v. Thompson is a jarring example of the irrelevancy of ethics
rules to the outcome of litigation. 173 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's recall of a death penalty mandate, finding no miscarriage of
justice, despite the Ninth Circuit's questioning as to whether Thomas
Martin Thompson was deprived of due process of law:
169. See generally Raeder, supra note 11.
170. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) ("[P]etitioner has not
convinced us that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a
different verdict if her testimony had been either severely impeached or excluded entirely.");
see also Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is Locked-Habeas Corpus
and Harmless Error, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 115, 124 (1994); Lynn Damiano, Note, Taking
a Closer Look at Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Ninth Circuit's Materiality Analysis in
Hayes v. Brown and Its Implications for Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
191 (2006) (discussing materiality in the context of federal habeas litigation).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991). Wallach held
that whether a new trial will be required depends on the materiality of the perjury to the
jury's verdict and the extent to which the prosecution was aware of the perjury. Id. If it is
established that the government knowingly permitted the introduction of material false
testimony reversal is "virtually automatic." Id. If the government was unaware of a
witness's perjury, however, a new trial is warranted only if "the court [is left] with a firm
belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been
convicted." Id.
172. Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor Is Cited for
Misconduct?, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (2003),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?act=main.
173. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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[A] serious question exists as to whether Thompson was deprived of due
process of law by the prosecutor's presentation of flagrantly inconsistent
theories, facts, and arguments to the two juries that separately heard
Thompson's case and that of his co-defendant, David Leitch. While the
district court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred, our
review of the record persuades us that the prosecutor's tactics may well
have resulted in Thompson's receiving a fundamentally unfair trial.
These tactics, including the use of the two highly dubious jailhouse
informants, appear to compound the constitutional violations that flow
from defense counsel's ineffective performance. 174
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected claims that the impeachment
of the jailhouse informants would have changed the result, the amazing
aspect of the Supreme Court's decision is that neither the majority opinion
nor the dissent made any mention of the prosecutor's misconduct.
However, this misconduct resulted in the original death penalty sentence,
since the inconsistent theory argued at the accomplice's trial with different
jailhouse informants would have precluded its imposition in Thompson's
case. 17 5 Instead, the decision appeared to focus on the issue of guilt, rather
than penalty. The defendant was executed on July 14, 1998.176 Ironically
the Supreme Court of California, where the case arose, explicitly held that
the tactic of arguing inconsistent theories to different juries violated due
process in 2005.177 If such practices do not even merit mention by the
Supreme Court in the death penalty context, it is difficult to imagine that an
overzealous prosecutor would be dissuaded from unethical conduct by the
Court's present mode of constitutional analysis.
Similarly, in determining the due process boundaries governing the
introduction of perjurious testimony, Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has
argued that the Court seems to have forgotten the line of cases that would
reverse for false witness testimony, without requiring a showing of
perjury. 178 In his view, "the Supreme Court's line-drawing between perjury
and false testimony perpetuates injustice and provides little incentive for
prosecutors ... to offer truthful testimony."' 179 Both courts and prosecutors
appear to downplay the possibility of perjury by jailhouse informants. For
example, the Supreme Court of California rejected the claim that the
admission of unreliable or perjurious jailhouse informant testimony violated
174. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997).
175. See Jack Call, Legal Notes, Judicial Control of Jailhouse Snitches, 22 Just. Sys. J.
73, 74-75 (2001).
176. Id. at 75.
177. In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931, 941-42 (Cal. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 939 (2005);
cf Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (holding that the prosecutor's inconsistent
theories did not void a guilty plea where the identity of the triggerman was not relevant to
the convicted charge, but finding remand necessary concerning their impact on death penalty
sentencing).
178. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter
So Much?, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1537, 1557-60 (2000).
179. Id. at 1538-39.
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due process, 180 even though the case originated in Los Angeles which had
widely publicized problems with fabricated jailhouse informant testimony
during the time frame of the murder trial in question. The Court's response
was that such testimony was not inherently unreliable; the defendant had an
opportunity to cross-examine the informant at trial, and the Court found his
claim of improper procedures for securing jailhouse informant testimony to
be speculative on the record. 181 In contrast, in United States v. Wallach, 182
clear evidence of perjury resulted in a reversal, where the informant was the
centerpiece of the case and the prosecutor had evidence that indicated he
"consciously avoided recognizing the obvious-that is, that [the informant]
was not telling the truth."' 83 Even here, the reversal was based on the
prosecutor's rehabilitation of the witness, which violated clear
constitutional doctrine, as opposed to his mere presentation of the evidence.
A brief review of the case law also reveals that Sixth Amendment
challenges to jailhouse informants are unlikely to succeed. 184 The current
legal approach virtually ensures continuing reliance on their testimony by
prosecutors, since credibility is viewed as a matter for the jury, rather than
as a bar to its admission. In United States v. Henry,185 the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when a paid informant
residing in the same cell block as the defendant was encouraged by the
prosecution to be alert for any statements made by the defendant. 186 The
conviction was reversed because the confession was viewed as deliberately
elicited, despite the government's warning that the informant should not
initiate any conversation, because the informant indicated the confession
was a product of his conversation with the defendant. 187 Adherence to this
strict view of governmental intervention appeared to reduce the ease with
which law enforcement could rely on jailhouse informants. However,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson' 88 retreated from Henry, holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not forbid admission of the accused's statements to a
jailhouse informant who is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to
stimulate conversations about the crime charged. ' 89 The court explained,
[A] defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by
showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or
voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather,
the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took
180. People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1117-18 (Cal. 2000).
181. Id. at 270-71.
182. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991).
183. Id. at 457 (reversing a conviction because a cooperating witness was not a jailhouse
informant).
184. See generally Tarlow, Silence, supra note 108.
185. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
186. Id. at 273-74.
187. Id. at 271.
188. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
189. Id. at 460.
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some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to
elicit incriminating remarks. 190
Thus, as long as jailhouse informants remain listening posts, the
confession is not constitutionally defective. In addition, if the jailhouse
informant is an entrepreneur who approaches the government after, rather
than before, the confession, government involvement will be lacking. As a
result, even solicited confessions would be admissible.
The Court's jurisprudence concerning civil liability for unethical
overreaching also gives prosecutors little incentive to adhere to the highest
ethical standards. Imbler v. Pachtman19' provides absolute prosecutorial
immunity for presentation of evidence. While Buckley v. Fitzsimmons192
granted prosecutors only qualified immunity for investigative functions,
which included obtaining a dishonest expert prior to bringing charges, 193
the Buckley decision is unlikely to have an impact, since most jailhouse
informants and experts are consulted after indictment. Generally,
prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution, the presentation of the state's case at trial, and other conduct
that is intimately associated with the judicial process are insulated from
liability by absolute immunity. 194 Kalina v. Fletcher195 reiterated Buckley's
view that "'acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of
judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as
an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
immunity." ' 196 In addition, Kalina stressed the unsolved nature of the
crime as the reason for Buckley's qualified immunity since "[t]here is a
difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and
interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the
detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested."'197 Immunity
also extends to state common law tort claims as well as to constitutional
claims. 198
The Court has consistently protected prosecutors from claims that they
presented fabricated evidence and dishonest experts at trial. Imbler
included a claim that the prosecutor had offered false testimony and
190. Id. at 459.
191. 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976), cited with approval in Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,485-
86 (1991) (distinguishing the investigative function of prosecutors, such as advising the
police, for which only qualified immunity applies).
192. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
193. See id. at 273-74.
194. Id. at 272.
195. 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (preparing and filing charging documents is protected by
absolute immunity, but executing certification for determination of probable cause is only
protected by qualified immunity).
196. Id. at 126 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273).
197. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
198. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124-25.
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suppressed exculpatory evidence, 199 while Buckley alleged that the
prosecution had sought out and hired an expert "who was well known for
her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony. '20 0 Ultimately, it
is not realistic to seek damages for the introduction of even admittedly
perjured testimony by jailhouse informants. For example, in McGhee v.
Pottawattamie County, absolute immunity protected prosecutors from a §
1983 action that was brought by individuals whose murder convictions had
been vacated.20 1 Despite allegations that prosecutors presented coerced and
fabricated jailhouse informant testimony at trial, the court viewed the
presentation of evidence as part of the prosecutor's function as an advocate
and therefore held that these acts were entitled to absolute immunity. 20 2
Professor Fred C. Zacharias suggests that "Imbler's premise is not
realistic" because the absence of disciplinary enforcement undercuts one of
the rationales for prosecutorial immunity posed by Imbler.2 03 In other
words, Imbler assumes that prosecutors are subject to "professional
discipline by an association of [their] peers.20 4  However, Imbler's
immunity analysis also rested on weightier concerns about the effect that
qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would have on the "broader public
interest. '20 5 For example, qualified immunity "would prevent the vigorous
and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. ' 20 6 The real goal is
"protecting the prosecutor from harassing litigation that would divert his
time and attention from his official duties and the interest in enabling him to
exercise independent judgment when 'deciding which suits to bring and in
conducting them in court."' 20 7 Kalina made clear "it is the interest in
protecting the proper functioning of the office, rather than the interest in
protecting its occupant, that is of primary importance." 208  Absolute
immunity "is not grounded in any special 'esteem for those who perform
these functions, and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office,
but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process
itself."' 20 9 Therefore, suggestions that absolute immunity should be
rejected in favor of qualified immunity for functions related to trial are
unlikely to succeed.
Even if the alleged misconduct is arguably investigative, it will not
necessarily survive summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. When the
199. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 416 (1976).
200. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 262.
201. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 475 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
202. See id. at 897-99; accord Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 139 (3d Cir.
2006).
203. Zacharias, supra note 59, at 777.
204. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
205. Id. at 427.
206. Id. at 427-28.
207. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 127 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)).
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Supreme Court remanded Buckley to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook dismissed the claim that the prosecution
bought the testimony of two codefendants, which was covered by absolute
immunity, since he held that this practice did not violate the Constitution.2 10
Cases where prosecutors concealed the payment at trial were distinguished
from this claim that the bought evidence was presented at trial.2 11
Similarly, the claim concerning expert shopping was rejected because
"[n]either shopping for a favorable witness nor hiring a practitioner of junk
science is actionable, although it may lead to devastating cross-examination
if the judge permits the expert witness to testify. '2 12 In other words,
procuring the fabricated expert testimony was separated from its use at trial,
which would be actionable, though subject to immunity. 2 13 Moreover,
Judge Easterbrook, in recognizing the controversial nature of the proposed
expert's testimony about boot marks, remarked that "[n]one of the many
courts that considered Robbins's testimony suggested that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by seeking her out and proffering her
conclusions. '2 14 This implies that he clearly did not view expert shopping
or presenting her decidedly questionable evidence as an ethical breach, let
alone one of constitutional dimension. Instead, it is simply part of the
adversarial process, where prosecutors can offer problematic evidence and
let judges decide whether the evidence should be admitted, so long as the
prosecutors do not know the evidence is false. 2 15
Of course, Buckley was atypical in that the expert was procured prior to
filing the action and never actually testified, although the defendant was
incarcerated for several years awaiting the trial that never happened. 21 6 In
most cases, the fraudulent expert will testify but ironically will also be
employed after indictment, which results in the prosecutor's defense of
absolute immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has
disagreed with Buckley, holding in Zahrey v. Coffey2 17 that any resulting
deprivation of liberty as traceable to the original procurement of the false
testimony is actionable. 2 18 Similarly, in Goldstein v. City of Long Beach,2 19
a § 1983 action was brought alleging the failure to institute an information-
sharing system regarding jailhouse informants and failing to adequately
train or supervise deputies regarding them.220 The Ninth Circuit held that
only qualified, rather than absolute, immunity existed in this setting.22 1 Of
210. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 796.
213. See id. at 796-97.
214. Id. at 796n.1.
215. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003).
216. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 795-96.
217. 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000).
218. See id. at 348-55.
219. 481 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007).
220. Id. at 1171.
221. See id. at 1173-76.
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course, to defeat qualified immunity, even in the absence of good faith, the
constitutional right had to have been clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.222 Thus, the road to civil recovery is long and tortuous,
and does not necessarily provide enough incentive to prosecutors to change
their practices.
In contrast, when prosecutors take their ethical responsibilities seriously,
constitutional doctrine may not help them when they claim retaliation for
refusing to acquiesce to what they believe is misconduct. The recent
whistle-blower case, Garcetti v. Ceballos,223 sends exactly the wrong
message to ethical prosecutors. 224  Deputy District Attorney Richard
Ceballos brought a § 1983 lawsuit for adverse employment action because
he recommended dismissal of a case on the basis of purported governmental
misconduct.2 25 At the behest of the defense counsel, Ceballos reviewed the
affidavit that police had used to obtain a critical search warrant.226 After
concluding it was inaccurate, Ceballos wrote a memo and recommended
dismissal. 227 When his supervisor proceeded with the prosecution,
Ceballos told her that he believed his memo was exculpatory material that
should be given to the defense. 228 Ceballos claimed that he was then
ordered to write a new memorandum that contained only the deputy
sheriffs statements. Instead, Ceballos proposed to turn over the existing
memorandum with his own conclusions redacted as work product, which he
did. Ceballos was called as a defense witness, and again alleged he was
told he would suffer retaliation if he testified that the affidavit contained
intentional fabrications. 229 After the trial court rejected the defense
challenge, Ceballos was denied a promotion and reassigned.230 The Court
recognized that exposing government "misconduct is a matter of
considerable significance" 231 and referred to the California Rules of
Professional Conduct, concerning the duty not to bring cases unless
supported by probable cause, as well as to Brady v. Maryland,
232
concluding that "[t]hese imperatives, as well as obligations arising from any
other applicable constitutional provisions and mandates of the criminal and
civil laws, protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would
order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions."
233
222. See, e.g., Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 355-56.
223. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
224. See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Professional Independence, Crim. Just.,
Summer 2007, at 4.
225. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
226. Id. at 1955.
227. Id. at 1955-56.
228. Id. at 1955-56, 1959.
229. Id. at 1956.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1962.
232. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
233. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
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However, the Court's holding suggests that the exact opposite will occur,
since Garcetti denied First Amendment protection to public employees who
make statements pursuant to their official duties, thereby holding that such
employees are not insulated from employer discipline. 234 Ironically, if the
prosecutor first shares his concerns in a public forum, rather than through
an internal memo, the First Amendment would have been implicated.
Again, my focus is not on the validity of the underlying constitutional
analysis in this case, but rather its impact on prosecutors who want to do the
right thing and are willing to stand up to pressure from superiors or office
culture to ignore looking too closely at favorable witnesses who may not be
telling the truth. The message delivered by Garcetti is to be a good soldier
and use the weapons at your disposal without worrying that you will be shot
down in court. Implicit in this approach is that you are more likely to be
ambushed by friendly fire, unless you keep your head down and act like a
team player.
Given the present constitutional analysis, it appears obvious that courts
cannot solve the problems posed by questionable witnesses such as
jailhouse informants and dishonest experts. 235  Resort to supervisory
powers to exclude evidence obtained through violations of disciplinary
rules is also unlikely when no constitutional violation exists, because such
powers are rarely invoked.2 36 Similarly, relying on purely evidentiary
doctrines has not slowed the flow of unreliable witnesses. As a result, it is
time to reinvigorate the ethical approach to prosecutorial practices, even
though it is unlikely that this shift will be accompanied by any attempt to
create an "ethics police." Yet shining a light on questionable ethical
practices, focusing on ethical training, and drafting rules and standards that
provide more specificity for dealing with common witness problems is
clearly better than simply wringing one's hands.
234. Id. at 1960.
235. Constitutional doctrine has also proved unhelpful in eliminating other causes of
wrongful convictions, such as eyewitness testimony and false confessions. See generally
Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 309 (2003); Gary L. Wells &
Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on
Lineups, I Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 765 (1995); Gary L. Wells, What Is Wrong with the
Manson v. Braithwaite Test of Eyewitness Identification Accuracy? (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Iowa State University Department of Psychology), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Mansonproblem.pdf.
236. Compare United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (indicating
that the court has discretion to suppress, but finding an exclusionary remedy inappropriate),
with United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1141 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (finding that
"Eleventh Circuit law is clear that an ethical breach cannot be the basis for exclusion of
evidence"). See generally Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2679 (2006)
(holding that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks supervisory powers to suppress evidence in state
courts); Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083 (1994).
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V. REINVIGORATING THE ETHICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
As Professor Zacharias has pointed out, professional code "can identify
moral issues, promote moral introspection by lawyers about appropriate
conduct, influence judicial standards, and facilitate communication within
the bar."237 Lack of enforcement suggests that more specificity in ethical
obligations is necessary. 2 38 More than ten years ago, one commentator
noted that entrusting prosecutors to use their individual discretion in
handling informants results in their not being instructed as to when rewards
may be too enticing, and establishes "systemic support for the informant to
maximize the benefit at any cost. '2 39 The problem is exacerbated because
prosecutors as well as police often lack guidelines as to handling
informants. Moreover, individual members of law enforcement agencies
may actually encourage informants to lie. 24 0 Self-regulation by prosecutors
of jailhouse informants can work, even though it has been argued that
policy guidelines may require subjective evaluations that would render
them unenforceable as ethical norms. 24 1
Prosecution screening of jailhouse informants is critical. 242 The chapter
of the ABA report on wrongful convictions that addressed jailhouse
informants stated that "[t]he first (and perhaps the most important) check on
unreliable testimony by informants is the prosecutor. ' 243  The most
thorough review of use of informants was a lengthy grand jury investigation
in Los Angeles undertaken as a result of the startling revelations of Leslie
Vernon White, who admitted to multiple acts of perjury as a jailhouse
informant, while demonstrating the ease with which a false confession
could be devised without ever having spoken to the defendant.244 The
report lambasted the district attorney's office for ethical laxity, decrying "its
deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to curtail
the misuse of jail house informant testimony." 24 5 This prompted the office
to enact detailed restrictions on the use of such witnesses, based in part on
its ethical obligations.246
237. Zacharias, supra note 59, at 771-72.
238. E.g., id. at 776; Flowers, supra note 19, at 927.
239. Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses
and Suggestions for Reform, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 81, 102 (1994).
240. See, e.g., id. at 99, 102; Ted Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Says He Lied at 3 Murder
Trials, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at Al (detailing testimony by jailhouse informant that "he
lied at ... murder trials at the urging of police").
241. See Cassidy, supra note 22, at 660.
242. See, e.g., Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23
Cardozo L. Rev. 817, 827-28 (2002).
243. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 67.
244. Grand Jury Report, supra note 159.
245. Id. at 6.
246. See L.A. County Dist. Att'y's Office, Legal Policies Manual 187-90 (2005)




The stringent restrictions on the use of jailhouse informants adopted in
the wake of the 1989 grand jury investigation has significantly decreased
their use in Los Angeles, though practice in other parts of California is
uneven.2 47 The policy requires prosecutors to present strong corroborative
evidence beyond the fact that the informant appears to know details of the
crime thought to be known only to law enforcement. 248 Prior approval
must be obtained from a jailhouse informant committee headed by the chief
assistant district attorney. 24 9 Finally, a central index ofjailhouse informants
is maintained, and detailed records are required to be kept and preserved.
250
The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice was
informed that the jailhouse informant committee "rarely approves the use of
in-custody informants as witnesses. None has been approved during the
past twenty months, and only twelve in the past four years. Throughout the
1990s, the annual number of approvals averaged less than six." 251  In
addition to the office's policy restrictions, interviews of in-custody
informants by attorneys or investigators from the district attorney's office
must be recorded, and training is given to deputies about the risks
associated with using jailhouse informants. 252 Los Angeles's policy also
makes it a continuing responsibility of all deputy district attorneys to ensure
that any attempt to falsify evidence is made known to the prosecutors
considering the use of the informant. 253 The policy of the California
Department of Justice Division of Criminal Law also lists passing a
polygraph test as a factor in determining whether to employ a jailhouse
informant. 254
The Canadian experience with wrongful convictions by jailhouse
informants recently prompted the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
to adopt stringent policies similar to those in Los Angeles, aimed at police
and prosecutorial use of jailhouse informants. The Canadian policy also
includes a recommendation to vigorously prosecute in-custody informers
who give false evidence to deter other jailhouse informants. 255 Most law
enforcement agencies in the United States have yet to adopt such policies.
Ironically, one of the few jailhouse informants in the United States to have
been tried and convicted of perjury is the same self-identified perjurer,
247. See CCFAJ Report, supra note 7, at 3-5.
248. See Legal Policies Manual, supra note 246, at 187-90.
249. See id. at 187.
250. Id. at 189-90.
251. CCFAJ Report, supra note 7, at 3.
252. Id.
253. Legal Policies Manual, supra note 246, at 188-89.
254. Cal. Dep't of Justice, Div. of Criminal Law, Jailhouse Information Policy 1 (n.d.),
available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/expertLCA%20AGs%20policy.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2007).
255. Canadian Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Resolutions Adopted at the 101st Annual
Conference 8-9 (2006), available at
http://www.cacp.ca/english/resolutions/RESOLUTIONS%202006/PackageAdopted.pdf.
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Leslie Vernon White,256 who was the original whistle-blower in the Los
Angeles jailhouse informant scandal that revealed the complicity of law
enforcement and prosecutors in furthering their lies. Some might cynically
see this as payback for revealing the seamier side of informant practices,
since one of the complaints in the Los Angeles grand jury report was that
informants were never prosecuted for falsifying evidence even when there
was no doubt about the lies.257 However, it would have been hard to ignore
his admission to fabricating evidence in twelve previous cases.
Turning to the admission of dubious experts, Professor Moriarty
recognizes that the Model Rules only reach false evidence, not unreliable
evidence, which prosecutors may feel is an evidentiary decision to be left to
judicial discretion. 258 Therefore, she argues that the prosecutor's special
obligation to do justice requires additions to the ethical rules concerning the
prosecutor's duty not to introduce evidence that he or she knows or
reasonably should know is unreliable. 259 For this purpose, she defines
unreliable broadly, requiring "that a reasonable person has a factual basis to
believe that the proposed evidence is incorrect, inaccurate, incomplete,
misleading . . . or without solid foundation. '260  I also support the
imposition of greater obligations concerning the presentation of expert
evidence, but think that the proposed definition of unreliability is too
sweeping because merely having a factual basis seems a very low standard
to meet and arguably could be satisfied if even one court excluded such
evidence. Given that this is an ethical not an evidentiary decision, a more
realistic approach might be to take the opposite perspective-that the
prosecutor should only introduce evidence when he or she has a factual
basis to objectively believe it is reliable. This would also appear to satisfy
Professor Saks's suggestion that a reasonable good faith belief should be
required that the party introducing the expert could make a well-grounded
showing that the expertise satisfies the admissibility standard. 26'
Yet who is the reasonable person being used as the focal point of the
analysis? The fact that many prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, other
lawyers, and judges have little grounding in science is especially telling
when a dispute arises over whether the science is fraudulent. Asking a
prosecutor to be judge and jury of a technique that his expert says yields
reliable results may ultimately prove unrealistic. Therefore, each
prosecutorial office should be required to adopt written policies governing
the introduction of forensic and other expert testimony. At a minimum,
prosecutors presenting specific expertise would be required to obtain
training. A procedure should also be established to have one or more
256. See Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a Dozen Cases, L.A. Times,
Jan. 4, 1990, at A24.
257. Grand Jury Report, supra note 159, at 90.
258. See Moriarty, supra note 12, at 30.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 29.
261. See Saks, supra note 12, at 428.
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prosecutors with experience in forensic or social science evidence to review
the introduction of evidence whose reliability has been questioned. This
approach would assist prosecutors in determining such issues as whether a
factual basis exists for reliability of a technique or the probability of a
random match. Even such a relatively light requirement might generate
controversy. For example, in referring to trace evidence or psychological
syndromes, experts often say that the evidence is "consistent with" the
defendant being the source of the specimen or the child being a victim of
abuse. Yet such consistency is often not quantified or even quantifiable.
If the prosecution requires the expert to testify to any potentially fatal
weakness in the reliability of the evidence, I think it goes too far to suggest
that prosecutors violate their ethical obligation if they offer the expertise.
Of course, the judge could still decide to exclude the evidence as
misleading, unreliable, or unduly prejudicial in the specific case. In other
words, if inflated claims are not made, the issue should be for the judge, not
the prosecutor. However, when the particular expertise has been subject to
repeated reliability attacks, the prudent prosecutor should use the most
reliable scientific evidence at his or her disposal and this should be required
by appropriate rule or policy. For example, given the large number of
wrongful convictions based on hair analysis, a prudent prosecutor should
not introduce hair analysis unless its result has been confirmed by
mitochondrial DNA. If it has, I see no reason to prohibit opinion evidence
based on microscopic analysis so long as it does not include statistics with
no foundation. On the other hand, if the mitochondrial DNA excludes the
defendant, an ethical prosecutor should not introduce any contrary opinion
based on microscopic analysis because it would be inaccurate, and therefore
violate the current ethical standards.
Finally, although a self-regulatory body, such as the Federal Office of
Professional Responsibility, may be viewed as providing relatively weak
enforcement of ethical violations, 262 its very existence has symbolic value.
The fact that no prosecutor wants to be investigated will always have some
deterrent value. The NDAA, which has created a Center for Prosecutorial
Ethics, is the obvious choice as the architect of such an organization, and
should investigate the feasibility of creating a self-regulatory body for state
prosecutors. While resistance to such a suggestion would no doubt be
substantial, if limited to examining cases in which courts found defendants
were wrongfully convicted, local prosecutorial offices would be less likely
to view it as an unfettered "ethics police." The selling point of such a
commission would be that it provides prosecutors with the ability to engage
in hindsight analyses of what went wrong in individual cases to strengthen
262. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice," 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 167 (2004); Ross, supra note 20, at
890 (observing that the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility is
"perceived by experts to engage in little more than 'whitewashes,' particularly when they fail




future ethical prosecutions, but is not subject to pressure by groups outside
of the prosecutorial community. The body would function in the same
manner as innocence commissions long used in Canada. Despite the cogent
arguments of Barry Scheck and others involved in innocence litigation, 263
reception in the United States to the idea of independent innocence
commissions has been extremely hostile.264 If prosecutors truly do not
want to convict the innocent, this should provide a way to improve ethical
practice as well as to address the underlying causes of wrongful
convictions. Limiting the review to prosecutors would minimize the current
major criticism by prosecutors that other stakeholders in the criminal justice
system are simply using such investigations to mask their real agenda,
which is to find and expose alleged wrongdoing by prosecutors. It is time
for prosecutors to take a more proactive stance to curtail practices that
contribute to wrongful convictions. Strengthening their ethical policies will
remind prosecutors about the values that first attracted them to public
service, and help to allay the cynicism of those who think that obtaining
convictions is the only raison d'tre of their calling.
CONCLUSION
My focus on jailhouse informants and dishonest experts is an outgrowth
of my interest in innocence litigation. The causes of wrongful convictions
are many, as are the potential solutions. Constitutional doctrine does not
currently appear designed to correct the failures that result in wrongful
convictions. Therefore, I have posed an alternative ethical framework that
will lessen the introduction of questionable witnesses, while giving
prosecutors the power to enhance their reputations as ministers of justice.
Moreover, this shift should not unduly impact their ability to win cases,
although learning to live with more rules and policies may take some
getting used to by prosecutors whose offices have previously scrutinized
their dismissals of questionable cases more than their use of questionable
witnesses.
263. See generally Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 333 (2002); Barry C. Scheck
& Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of "Innocence Commissions" in America, 86
Judicature 98 (2002); Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A
Comparative Perspective, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1241 (2001); David Horan, The Innocence
Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. Ill. U. L. Rev.
91 (2000).
264. Recently, North Carolina created an Innocence Inquiry Commission to review
claims of innocence based on new evidence that has not previously been presented. See
generally Jerome M. Maiatico, Note, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 Duke L.J. 1345 (2007); cf Medwed, supra note
57, at 177 & nn.268-70 (discussing institutional and political barriers deterring prosecutors
from accepting claims of innocence).
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